ABSTRACT The false data injection (FDI) attack is a potential threat to the security of smart grids, and therefore, such threats should be assessed carefully. This paper proposes a self-governing FDI attack method with exploitation and exploration mechanisms and then evaluates its threat to power systems. The attack is executed by viruses embedded in monitoring systems in substations. First, the FDI attack is formulated as a partially observable Markov decision process. Then, an improved online reinforcement learning method called nearest sequence memory Q-learning is adopted to make the attack more effective. Finally, propagation, an inherent property of viruses, is described using a propagation-evolution model that serves as the exploration mechanism for the proposed FDI attack. To validate the proposed attack method, cosimulations of daily operations of the IEEE 39-bus system are performed in which both the automatic voltage control system and the proposed FDI attack are modeled. Test results show that the proposed FDI method can cause voltage collapse even if only a few substations are infected.
I. INTRODUCTION A. MOTIVATION
Novel communication technologies and control methods can enable better smart grid regulation; however, they also introduce serious cybersecurity threats [1] . For example, in 2010, the ''Stuxnet'' worm hit the staff computers of an Iranian nuclear plant and caused irreversible damage [2] . This is an example of a typical cyberattack against a power system. Cyberattacks may also cause cascading failures in a power system, thereby posing a serious threat to national infrastructure [3] , [4] .
A false data injection (FDI) attack is an important type of cyberattack in which a malicious attacker injects false data into a control and communication system to disrupt its normal operation [5] . Researchers have shown the existence of attack patterns capable of bypassing state estimation (SE) and presented the smallest set of manipulated measurements needed to launch a hidden attack [3] . The threat of FDI attacks cannot be neglected and should be assessed thoroughly. This study develops a novel self-governing FDI attack model with weak assumptions to make it more realistic. In contrast to existing studies, it is assumed that viruses know nothing about the parameters and topology of a target system. A virus can only obtain local measurements from its host substation. Such attacks are launched by independent viruses enhanced with reinforcement learning. The attacker only has to embed one virus in the target system, following which the virus can propagate through the target system and independently launch decentralized attacks. Studies on FDI attacks enhanced with reinforcement learning may help in identifying vulnerabilities in a power grid and in performing a security assessment.
B. RELATED WORK
Studies on FDI attacks vary depending on the perspective of the attack targets. Sridhar and Govindarasu [6] modeled smart FDI attacks against automatic generation control systems and proved that the system frequency is affected by such attacks.
Sridhar and Manimaran [7] discussed direct and indirect FDI attacks against automatic voltage control (AVC) systems as well as the disturbance of bus voltages through sensitivity analysis. Electricity market operations are also vulnerable to FDI attacks [8] , [9] .
Most studies usually make some basic assumptions. For example, some studies [5] , [10] - [12] assumed that attackers can obtain complete knowledge of the system topology, parameters, and measurements. In this case, constructing an attack pattern becomes an optimization problem. Other studies [6] , [7] , [13] assumed that FDI attacks are launched based on local topological, electrical parameters, and local measurements and then presented static attacking strategies. Sou et al. [14] discussed a dynamic strategy. Yu and Chin [15] proposed a blind FDI attack. Attackers who do not know the system parameters or topology uses principal component analysis to infer critical information from limited measurements. For example, Kim et al. [16] inferred information using a subspace method. An effective FDI attack strategy that can be performed using only limited knowledge and information will be more cost effective and less detectable and, consequently, a bigger security threat. From this perspective, this study discusses an FDI attack strategy based on reinforcement learning. In this strategy, an attacker launches attacks through viruses that attack substations independently without centralized control. The viruses do not know the topological or electrical parameters of the substation; therefore, they obtain information from their host substations.
Exploration is a key part of this decentralized attack. Viruses exploit information about the host substation and perform a wide exploration of different substations. They duplicate, propagate, accumulate information, and evolve within the cyber-physical system. Many studies have investigated virus propagation models. Draief et al. [17] discussed how the cybersystem topology and probability of spread affect the final propagation state. Other studies [18] , [19] modeled virus propagation accurately using a Markov chain and then simplified it. Yang et al. [20] discussed a bivirus competing propagation model in cybersystems. In this light, this study presents a simplified propagation-evolution model to describe a multiple substation infection scenario and discusses the possible impact on the power system.
C. CONTRIBUTIONS
This study discusses decentralized FDI attacks with exploitation and exploration mechanisms. It makes the following contributions:
(1) This study proves the feasibility of purely data-driven FDI attacks on power systems. The attacker launches this attack without knowing the topological and electrical parameters of the target system. It is assumed that the attacker can only observe local measurements in a substation. Under these weak assumptions, the FDI attack becomes more realistic but may be less effective. After modeling the FDI attack from a substation as a partially observed Markov decision process (POMDP), we apply online reinforcement learning to find an optimal attack strategy. Then, we develop an effective FDI attack method that is strictly constrained by the above assumptions. Finally, this attack is executed through a malicious virus injected into the substation that aims to disrupt normal power system operations.
(2) This study introduces a virus propagation model to the FDI attack method. This model describes the stochastic process of a virus spreading in a target power system. Although worm spreading has been studied extensively in the field of cybersecurity, ours is the first study of FDI attacks on power systems in consideration of virus-spreading effects. Test results show that after several rounds of spreading, the proposed virus-based FDI attack can create voltage collapses easily.
(3) This study presents a knowledge merging method for accumulating useful experiences from different virus instances. Through remaining dominant utility functions associated with states and actions, a new Q-matrix is generated and referred for late attacks when two viruses meet at the same substation. This method enables virus evolution, thereby speeding-up information accumulation and enhancing the efficacy of proposed FDI attacks.
(4) This study also discusses the weakness of the proposed FDI attack and proposes a defense strategy against it.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
This study discusses decentralized FDI attacks with exploitation and exploration mechanisms. The target system is an AVC that regulates the active and reactive power outputs of a generator. The AVC system model includes models for power flow (PF), SE and bad data identification (BDI) system, and optimal power flow (OPF). The AVC optimizes a power system's reactive power flow and sends commands to the generators' automatic voltage regulators. Fig. 1 shows the AVC system and an FDI attack against it. A power system's PF is modeled using a set of time-variant nonlinear equations in which the load shape is defined by a load curve. This study considers a distributed slack bus instead of a single slack bus.
The weighted least squares approach is commonly used for modeling SE. It has a simple BDI mechanism that uses residual examination. Detailed models of SE and BDI can be referred elsewhere [21] .
In the OPF model, the objective function is to minimize net loss. The PF and bus voltage constraints are set to ensure that the system runs within the safe zone. The OPF model is expressed as follows:
( 1) where P Gen and Q Gen are respectively the active power and reactive power output of generators, P Gmax and P Gmin are respectively the upper and lower limits for the active power output of a generator, Q Gmax and Q Gmin are respectively the upper and lower limits for the reactive power output of a generator, P Load and Q Load are respectively the active and reactive loads, V and θ are respectively the magnitude and phase angle of the bus voltage, P(θ, V ) and Q(θ, V ) are respectively the functions for calculating the active and reactive power flows using a complex bus voltage, P Br is the vector of the branch active power flow, P Br min and P Br max are respectively the lower and upper limits for the branch active power flow, Q Br is the vector of the branch reactive power flow, and Q Br min and Q Br max are respectively the lower and upper limits of the branch reactive power flow.
The OPF and SE modules rely on correct and intact data collected from each substation. A malicious attacker embeds viruses into substations and interrupts normal uplink data. This study uses weak assumptions of the information obtained by the attacker to enhance the feasibility and practicality of the proposed FDI attack method. These assumptions are listed below:
• The viruses do not know the topological and electrical parameters of the power system.
• The viruses can only observe local measurements from the host substation and only decide the optimal attack strategy based on local measurements.
• Viruses can spread through the network carrying their previously learned knowledge. The attack uses both ''exploitation'' and ''exploration'' mechanisms. (1) ''Exploration'': A virus does not know the topological and electrical parameters of the power system. It has to learn these through trial-and-error. In each trial, the virus performs an action and observes the system feedback. Gradually, the virus collects more information about the system, thus making its attacks more threatening. ''Exploitation'' thus represents the process of obtaining information through reinforcement learning.
(2) ''Exploitation'': Viruses duplicate and spread to other substations through a propagation process, as discussed in Section V. When doing so, they carry previously learned knowledge. Finally, viruses can accumulate knowledge learned from all substations to enhance their attack effects.
This study evaluates the impact of the newly proposed FDI attack on power systems. By understanding the attack mechanism, defense strategies can be developed to enhance power system security.
III. FDI ATTACK MODEL
As shown in Fig 2, the POMDP is used to describe an FDI attack launched by viruses. A POMDP consists of the following eight elements: state, observation, action, statetransition probability, state-observation probability, reward, and strategy:
A. STATE AND OBSERVATION
The complex bus voltage vector is set to be the POMDP state, that is,
. S denotes the set of all possible s.
FIGURE 2. FDI attacks modeled using POMDP.
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A virus can obtain measurements from its host substation through a POMDP observation as expressed below:
where M ob ∈ R n M are the measurements acquired by the virus from the host substation, n M is the number of measurements, and m i represents the ith measurement of the substation. The discrete per unit value of each measurement m i is defined as follows:
where m 0 i is the lower limit of m i ; m i , the interval between discrete values; k, an integer that satisfies 1 ≤ k ≤ n DM i ; and n DM i , the number of discrete steps. Hereafter, M ob is simply denoted as o.
B. ACTION
The virus manipulates measurements sent from substations to the control center. These measurements are expressed as
where r i is the error ratio of measurement m i ; it is adjusted according to the POMDP state. We set the error ratio interval as r min
. Then, r i may be discretized as follows:
where · means that fractions are rounded down and a i is the false data injection action for the ith measurement. Then, the virus action can be represented by vector a:
Thus, the number of all possible POMDP actions is
The set of all possible POMDP actions a is denoted as A.
C. PROBABILITIES OF STATE TRANSITIONS AND STATE OBSERVATIONS
The virus observes measurements of its host substation M ob . Then, it injects certain false data, denoted as action a. The power system is disturbed by the injected false data, and the state transitions from s to s are described by the state transition probability P s |s, a in the POMDP model. The state transition probability satisfies the following constraint:
However, state s is unobservable for the virus; thus, the state transition probability cannot be acquired. The state observation probability B(o|s) is defined as the probability of observing o given system state s. Similarly, the following constraint exists:
D. REWARD
When the bus voltage goes beyond its range, stability problems are likely to occur. Thus, the proposed attack uses bus voltage sag as the immediate reward for the attacker as follows:
where V t is the magnitude of the bus voltage of the host substation after false data has been injected; V 0 , the normal bus voltage; and D(V 0 ) − D(V t ), the discretized bus voltage sag.
The action corresponding to unmanipulated data is denoted
Reward R 0 represents the reward for action a 0 . D(·) is the discretization function for bus voltage, and it is defined as follows:
where V 0 i is the lower limit for the discretized bus voltage; V , the discretization interval; and N DS Vi , the number of discretization levels. Reward R 0 can be expressed as
where D(V ex ) is the bus voltage that the attacker hopes to achieve. A larger R 0 value leads to more conservative attacker behavior. For a large R 0 value, viruses tend to choose no data manipulation as the optimal action.
IV. EXPLOITATION USING REINFORCEMENT LEARNING
In the proposed attack, the virus must learn a pragmatic attack strategy. Reinforcement learning is an effective approach for obtaining a suboptimal solution of a POMDP. In this study, nearest sequence memory (NSM) is used to achieve better performance. McCallum [22] proposed NSM Q-learning and showed that it performs well for robot navigation. NSM Q-learning drives the virus to learn online and to generate and adjust its attack strategy. Ordinary Q-learning only considers the current state when updating the Q matrix, whereas NSM Q-learning additionally considers the history states. The NSM Q-learning process can be described as follows:
where A and O have the same definitions as those in (2) . In addition, r t is the reward acquired at moment t. The buffer memory Y = [y 1 , y 2 , · · · , y t ] records the entire history of 48788 VOLUME 6, 2018
The depth of this buffer memory must be limited from the viewpoint of complexity. If t > n y , the first t − n y entries will be deleted, giving
NSM Q-learning considers the nearest sequence memory recorded in Y . The neighbor function is introduced to describe the ''distance'' between two memories y i 1 and y i 2 :
For y i 1 , the set of its k N nearest memories is denoted as Y N (y i 1 ), where k N is a crucial parameter for the NSM Q-learning algorithm.
Reward Q(t, a) is the overall reward for a certain action a, and it is calculated as follows:
where q(y i ) is the utility function for memory q(y i ). The optimal action is selected according to Q(t, a) as
After the action is executed, the system state transitions from s t to s t+1 , and the virus obtains new observation o t+1 . According to the observed bus voltage, utility function q(y t ) is updated as follows:
Utility function q(y) is equal to the Q function in ordinary Q-learning. Figure 3 shows a simplified diagram of an FDI attack simulation. The simulation consists of three simulation phases: physical system, FDI attack, and control system.
V. EXPLORATION THROUGH PROPAGATION
The proposed FDI attack is launched through viruses. The viruses exploit knowledge about the system by using reinforcement learning. By contrast, existing studies mostly focused on centralized attacks in which attackers collect information from various substations and decide whether to inject false data into particular substations. When a virus directly launches an attack, it can only obtain and manipulate local measurements. In both biology and cybersecurity, propagation and mutation are important features of viruses. Viruses perform exploitation to collect information about the host substation as well as vast exploration through different substations. They duplicate, propagate, and evolve in the cyber-physical system. We develop a simplified propagationevolution model to describe these features. 
A. PROPAGATION
Propagation is an inherent feature of viruses. A power system is a large-scale and sophisticated system. It would be difficult to seriously damage such a system with a single virus injecting false data into a single substation. Therefore, a pragmatic virus-launched FDI attack on a large system requires an exploration mechanism for propagating through and learning from the system. In this study, the virus has no knowledge before infection and learns everything through trial-and-error. It duplicates and explores other substations.
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The propagation model used in this study is a simplified version of the model proposed in [18] . Figure 4 shows a simple illustration of this model that describes the propagation probabilistically. As mentioned in Section I, in the initial state, the attacker knows nothing about the topological structure of the target power system. Thus, the initially infected substation can be considered a random selection. We denote the probability that substation i is the first infected one as P init (i). Thus, the following constraint exists:
Assume that the propagation process for each virus is independent. At every time step, each virus has a probability of propagating to a certain substation. Let P infect t,i be the probability that substation i has been infected at time t. The infection probability is denoted as P t,i (j). Here, P t,i (j), i = j represents the probability of a virus spreading from substation i to substation j. Furthermore, P t,i (i) means that substation i is infected at time t and remains infected at the next time; in other words, the virus is not eliminated at time t. Similarly, the probability that the virus is removed is defined as 1 − P t,i (i). Then, the probability of substation j being infected at time t + 1 can be described as
where L in (21) denotes the set of all infected substations. In the simulation, the propagation is a random process described by P init (i) and P t,i (j). 
B. EVOLUTION
The proposed attack uses a simple evolution model of the virus considering previously learned knowledge. When a virus duplicates itself and spreads to another substation, the copies inherit the previously learned knowledge; however, they are not the same viruses anymore. They continue to exploit this knowledge in different substations, and therefore, the knowledge they carry differs. When exploring different substations, some viruses will accumulate knowledge and launch more dangerous attacks. Knowledge inheritance is possible because of the same structure of knowledge in NSM Q-learning and the homogeneity of the power system. In other words, similar types of measurements are made in different substations. The values of certain types of measurement in different substations, for example, bus voltage magnitude, are similar in per-unit values. Because of these properties, data alignment is relatively easy in NSM Q-learning. Furthermore, knowledge learned in one substation is probably valid in another substation because of these properties. If two viruses meet in a substation, for example, substation j is already infected when another virus spreads from substation i to j, the evolution model needs to be considered. This situation may not occur if the infection probability P t,i (j) is small. However, it is likely to occur if the infection probability is large. In this situation, the different ''knowledge" carried by viruses is merged.
The merging of two viruses refers to their knowledge gained from previous attacks being merged to formulate an updated attack strategy. Then, using this updated attack strategy may make FDI attacks on a newly intruded substation more efficient and effective. The merging of two utility functions is a point-to-point merging. It depends on the property of the function, which is discretized and is expressed as a matrix. Merging the ''knowledge'' of two neural networks is much more difficult. In (22) , y = (o, a) represents taking action a under observation o. Merging is performed separately for each y i , through which the ''experience'' of two viruses under similar conditions is merged. For two utility functions q 1 (y) and q 2 (y) that represent two viruses, the merged utility function q * (y) is defined as follows:
where
Note that ∀y means y = (o, a), ∀o ∈ O, ∀a ∈ A, rather than ∀y ∈ Y .
The merging process is guided by the simple idea that useful knowledge should always be retained. There are three different conditions: neither has the experience (also called memory) y, one of the two has the experience y, and both have the experience y.
(1) When q 1 (y) and q 2 (y) both equal zero, none of the viruses have experienced such a situation, and thus, the combined utility function equals zero. (2) When q 1 (y) or q 2 (y) is nonzero, one of the viruses has memory y, and thus, the combined utility selects the nonzero element. (3) When q 1 (y) and q 2 (y) are all nonzero, both viruses have ''knowledge'' of such circumstances, and thus, the merged utility function is a weighted combination of two values. The weights are chosen as S q 1 /S q and S q 2 /S q ; they represent how ''rich'' the knowledge is.
VI. CASE STUDY
A cyber-physical cosimulation is used to study the influence of FDI attacks launched by viruses. The cosimulation platform was implemented by combining different off-theshelf power system analysis toolboxes and was developed in MATLAB. The analysis functions from the MATPOWER and PSAT toolboxes are used. Details of the design of the cosimulation platform can be referred elsewhere [23] . An IEEE 39-bus system [24] is selected as the test system with fully functioning SE and OPF modules. In the test case, each bus in the IEEE 39-bus system is considered a substation. Appendix A shows details of the configurations of the test system, SE, OPF, POMDP, and NSM Q-learning. Appendix B shows the topology of the IEEE 39-bus system.
The load curve λ D (t) shown in Fig. 5 describes the load over a day. During the simulation, the active and reactive loads change according to the load curve λ D (t) and the load ratio λ L :
where P Load0 and Q Load0 respectively represent the basic active and reactive load (vector) of the IEEE 39-bus system. This section consists of three subsections that explain different aspects of the proposed FDI attack. Section VI-A illustrates a typical single substation attack scenario. The process of misleading SE and OPF is shown to show how the attack strategy works. Section VI-B illustrates a typical propagation attack to provide an intuitive understanding of how a propagation attack could undermine the stability of the power system. Section VI-C presents general test cases consisting of scenarios in which different buses are attacked under different load levels. In this part, we argue the following points: (1) the proposed FDI attack method can pose a severe threat to a power system regulated by an AVC and (2) if the virus can propagate and evolve, such an attack can become even more dangerous.
A. SINGLE SUBSTATION ATTACK
This section discusses an attack on a single substation. In this scenario, a virus infects a substation (bus #38) and injects manipulated data into the power system. Through NSM Q-learning, the virus gradually learns to undermine the system's stability. The load ratio is set to λ L = 2.4. Fig. 6 shows the minimum bus voltage min bus V bus and active power loss. The attack causes system collapse. Immediately before collapse (t = 9.3 h), the virus injects manipulated data and the SE is misled, as shown in Table 1 Table 2 . Finally, the commands sent to generators buses #37 and #38 lead to the collapse of the target power system. In contrast to many studies that assume that the attacker uses only one action to control the system, this study assumes VOLUME 6, 2018 that the virus can infect a substation. Subsequently, it can continually perform malicious actions. Initially, the virus possesses no knowledge about the target system and no communication is feasible. It then learns how to bypass the SE and damage the grid. Through trial-and-error, the virus finally gains enough knowledge and successfully performs a malicious action at t = 9.3 h. As illustrated above, after enough information has been accumulated, the virus learns an effective action under that state to bypass the SE, mislead the OPF, and ultimately collapse the whole system.
The numerical results for the bus voltage and active power loss near the collapse point are unrealistic. These indicate that the system is no longer stable. In our simulation, the power system dynamics are modeled by continuously changing the power flow following load variations and reactive power regulations. The power flow is generally represented by a set of nonlinear equations that is solved by the Newton-Raphson method. When Newton-Raphson iterations do not converge, the maximum loading level causing voltage collapse can be identified. Near this collapse point, the numerical results of bus voltages may drop to zero, and the corresponding Jacobian matrix might be singular. The numerical values can only indicate that the system is no longer stable.
B. PROPAGATION ATTACK
In a propagation attack, the virus spreads in the test system according to the propagation-evolution model described in Section IV. The propagation parameters are set as
These parameters describe a spreading process with a very low infection probability and zero cure probability [18] . Initially, a virus infects a substation (bus #34) and then spreads to buses #34, #22, #38, #17, #14, and #5. Note that the single substation attack on bus #34 does not cause system collapse according to the simulation result shown in Fig. 6 . However, when propagation is enabled, viruses collapse the system, as shown in Fig. 7 . Tracing back to the last converged OPF period (6.4 h), Tables 3 and 4 show the misled estimations and commands. As illustrated, additional commands are misled in this case. After 6.4 h, the SE never converges again; thus, the system loses centralized control. This alone will not cause a big disturbance. However, after 6.4 h, the system experiences a sharp increase in load (see Fig. 5 ) that ultimately overruns the test system. Fig. 8 shows the sequence of infection spread. A virus first infects bus #34. It learns to destabilize the system through trial-and-error. This procedure is the same as that described in Section VI-A until the virus successfully spreads to bus #22 4 h later. By using the proposed exploration mechanism, the virus takes the previously learned Q matrix with it to the new host substation. However, no communication is allowed among these viruses. Thus, the two viruses on buses #34 and #22 begin an uncoordinated attack using the knowledge they have learned. The spreading procedure continues. As is well-known in the field of biology, infection spread becomes faster as more buses are infected. The inheritance of knowledge helps the uncoordinated attack. These viruses cannot communicate, and therefore, forming a certain pattern that contaminates sufficient measurements to bypass the SE is very difficult. Propagation attacks mainly damage the system by forcing the SE offline. Then, the load fluctuation finally disables the system because there is no centralized control.
C. GENERAL CASE Fig. 9 shows a general case in which 195 propagation attack scenarios (five different load ratios and 39 initial infection buses) were tested. Then, a general case of a single substation attack was simulated as a control experiment, as shown in Fig. 10 . In these two figures, black bars indicate that voltage collapse has occurred in this scenario. Here, voltage collapse is defined as the bus voltage dropping below its operational limit of 0.8 p.u.. Figs. 9 and 10 show that a single attack may pose a threat to the power system and that propagation may deteriorate this situation. When several viruses are involved in the attack, more measurements are interpolated, and this increases the information entropy. Chaotic measurements cause the SE to deviate from the real state. The strategy of a virus can also evolve in different directions: (1) in a single attack, some viruses choose to cheat the SE, that is, make the SE converge to an incorrect state, and (2) in a propagation attack, after several trial-and-error iterations, the SE fails to converge in almost all cases. The FDI attacks then actually become denial-of-service attacks. This tendency is a direct result of the basic assumption: once a virus compromises a substation, it cannot communicate because of the firewall. When viruses cannot exchange information, they cannot collaborate to cheat the SE. Reinforcement learning then guides the virus in another direction, that is, toward paralyzing the SE.
VII. DISCUSSION: MITIGATION OF PROPOSED ATTACK
The attacks described in this study can be mitigated. Two mitigation methods are presented for the weaknesses of the attacks.
(1) This type of FDI attack requires a long learning period. The injected virus initially does not possess any pragmatic strategy. It needs to learn through trial-and-error. In the above test cases, the learning process repeats approximately 10 3 times. In each round, the viruses observe local measurements and inject manipulated data. If we can spot and interrupt the learning process before the virus adopts a pragmatic strategy, such an attack will probably fail. (2) Attacks on different substations are not equally damaging. The detailed patterns of these vulnerable buses still need further investigation. As a simple example, buses with both generators and loads are significantly more vulnerable. Because the set of critical buses is relatively small, we can improve their security to reduce the probability of infection. When considering the propagation process, there may also be certain combinations of buses that can cause severe damage when infected together. Thus, if we can prevent the virus from infecting these combinations of buses, the viruses will have limited effect. To achieve this, we can increase the heterogeneity of the cyber-system; specifically, we can use equipment from different manufacturers in power system planning to prevent a critical combinations of infections.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This study investigated a type of FDI attack on a power system with exploitation and exploration mechanisms. This type of attack only requires local measurements. An attack strategy based on NSM Q-learning was proposed and validated. Then, a simplified virus exploration model was introduced.
This study proposed a new type of decentralized FDI attack. The virus can learn from limited information and propagate carrying its previously learned knowledge. In other words, no human intervention is needed once the virus is embedded. These properties can significantly lower the barriers to launching an FDI attack. Test cases illustrate that this attack method can pose a severe threat to power systems regulated by an AVC. The test results reveal a new cyberphysical threat to power systems.
The proposed attacks can be mitigated. First, if we can spot and interrupt the learning process before the virus adopts a pragmatic strategy, the attack will probably fail. Second, attacks on different substations are not equally damaging. Because the set of critical buses is relatively small, we can improve their security to reduce the probability of infection.
The results of this study may help in recognizing vulnerabilities and enhancing security. We will further study the propagation path of such attacks while proposing detection and defense strategies. Fig. 11 shows the topology of the IEEE 39-bus system. There is no modification in the original IEEE 39-bus circuit except for the distributed slack bus mentioned in section II. 
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